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I. INTRODUCTION 
The problem of aircraft noise, aptly called the mal du si~cle 
of the modern era, became acute with the advent of jet travel. Its 
effect on those living near airports has been the subject of much 
litigation throughout the industrialised world in the last twenty 
years. The impending introduction of the supersonic jet to commercial 
flights on a world scale with the associated threat of the sonic bang 
1 
once more brings to the fore - this time perhaps with even greater 
urgency - the underlying conflict of priorities between short-term 
development in technology, trade and communication on the one hand, 
and on the other hand the long-term exigencies of preserving a physical 
environment favourable to human survival. 
At a time when landing rights for the Concorde is a subject 
of court action, public protest and diplomatic embarrassment, and 
increasing aircraft noise a matter of contention in a number of New 
Zealand cities, 2 it may be of some practical interest to cast back a 
decade to see how the French themselves fared in their battle over 
Concorde's baby brother, the Caravella. This battle culminated in 
the first case of aircraft noise to come before a civil court in 
France, Societe E.R.V.E. c. Air France, 3 when the courts developed a 
formula which has been followed ever since. 
This paper will discuss thatdecision in the context of the 
French Code of Civil Aviation and the relevant principles of general 
French tort law. Then, by way of comparison, the common law and 
statutory remedies available under New Zealand law will be evaluated 
in the course of an inquiry into the probably outcome should a 
similar case of airport noise arise before the New Zealand courts. 
II. SOCIETE E.R.V.E. C. AIR FRANCE 
A. The circumstances 
The case arose in Nice where the problem of aircraft noise 
was particularly acute due to the situation of the airport only six 
kilometres from the heart of the city, at one end of the fashionable 
Promenade dee Anglaie so beloved of the well-heeled English tourists 
of the Edwardian era. The airport itself was built on a strip of 
land juttin out into the sea with the runway almost parallel to 
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the shore, so that aircraft landing and taking off did not have to 
fly over residential areas and were in fact forbidden to do so. 
However, the proximity of the airport to the city meant that the 
runway was only a few hundred metres away from the nearest dwellings. 
Everything had been done to reduce the effect of airoraft 
noise on nearby inhabitants. Pilots were under orders to fly out to 
sea as quickly as possible and to reduce engine throttle to the 
minimum consonant with safety. On the other hand, it was impossible 
to insulate nearby dwellings completely against the noise, a.nd in 
any case to do so would have augmented building costs in a region 
where they were already exorbitant.4 
B. The parties 
The principal plaintiff in E.R.V.E. _Q. Air France was a 
builder who bought land bordering on Nice airport for the purpose of 
building two blocks of apartments for sale. All the apartments in 
the first block were sold prior to completion in September 1958. The 
second block was nearing completion when Air France introduced the 
medium-range jet Caravelle mto Nice.5 The builder claimed that as a 
result of the intense noise made by these jets on landing and take-off, 
he was unable to dispose of the apartments except for one sold in 
August 1960. He sued the airline for 2 million francs. 
Three other parties joined the builder as plaintiffs. They 
were the purchaser of the only apartment sold from the second block, 
the owner of five other apartments nearby, and the neighbourhood 
residents' association. The association claimed only one franc as 
symbolic damages and sought an astreinte
6 to prohibit overflight of 
the neighbourhood at low altitude by Air France's Caravelles, on pain 
of a fine of 500 francs for each infringement. 
While Air France was only one of several airlines flying 
jets into Nice, it was responsible for over half the total commercial 
jet air movements into the airport for both 1963 and 1964.
7 
c. The problem of jurisdiction 
The case took over six years to work its way up to the supreme 
court of F'rance, the Court of Cassation. Much of the delay in th 
initial stages was caused by the airline's attempt to plead 
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jurisdictional issues relying on the French system of separate sets 
of courts: one, the civil oourts,
8 dealing with disputes between 
subject and subject, and another, the administrative courts, 9 
adjudicating between subject and State. 
When the action was begun in the Commercial Court, a special 
civil court of first instance,
10 Air France invoked a decree11 which 
conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the ordinary civil courts -
tribunaUI de grande instance - for all cases concern ing delictual 
liability for damage of any nature caused by any vehicle. Accepting 
Air France's submission, the Commercial Court held on 23 March 1962 
that an aircraft was a vehicle within the broad terms of the decree 
and declared itself incompetent to hear the case. 
The case then went before the tribunal de grande instance in 
Nice. There Air France joined as a third party the Nice Chamber of 
Commerce, licensed operator of the airport, holding it responsible 
for siting the airport so close to the city that Air France's jets 
caused damage to the plaintiffs. When the Chamber of Commerce claimed 
that since the action concerned the use of a public work, it should 
be brought under the jurisdiction of the adminiotrative courts, Air 
France resiled from its own previous submission before the Commercial 
Court and adopted the same stand. Despite a deolinatoire de competence
12 
in the same terms locf8ed by the Prefect of the d6partement of Alpes-
Maritimes, the tribunal de grande instance rejected this claim and 
declared itself competent to proceed with both the principal action 
against the airline and the third party action against the Chamber 
of Commerce. 
However, a conflict over jurisdiction having been raise d by 
the Prefect of Alpes-Maritimes, the case came before the court set up 
solely and specifically to settle such disputes, the "Conflicts 
Tribunal" made up of equal numbers of jucf8es fro:n the Court of 
Cassation and the Conseil d'Etat. That body ruled, on 27 January 
1964, that the principal action against Air France should proceed 
before the courts of civil jurisdiction, i n this case the tribunal 
de grande instance, but that the airline's action against the 
Chamber of Commerce should be heard in an administrative court. 
On the eve of the hearing before the tribunal de grande 
instance in Nice, Air France joined as parties thirteen of the 
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twenty-six other French and foreign airlines which also flew jets 
into Nice. 
The tribunal de grande instance delivered its judgment on 
9 December 1964. Thie decision was confirmed, with certain variations, 
by the Court of Appeal in Au on 17 February 1966. Finally, on 8 May 
1968, the decision of the Court of Appeal was upheld by the Court of 
Cassation. 
D. The judgments 
1. In the court of first instance 
The tribunal de grande instance disallowed Air France's 
joinder of the other airlines as co-defendants on the ground that the 
plaintiffs were seeking remedy only against Air France's jets for 
whose activity the other airlines were not answerable. It then 
proceeded to hold Air France liable under article 36 of the Code of 
Civil Aviation13 for all damage caused by noise made by its Caravelles 
which was in excess of the normal noise level in the plaintiffs' 
neighbourhood, damages to be reduced to the extent the plaintiffs 
themselves might have been at fault. 14 
Under article 36 the operator of an aircraft is "liable 
ipso jure for damage caused by the movements of the aircraft or by 
objects falling therefrom to persons or things on the surface. This 
liability can be attenuated or displaced only by proof of fault of 
the victim." 15 
The court interpreted this legislation as imposing on aircraft 
operators an "absolute and objective" liability which could not be 
displaced either by act of God, act of a stranger, or proof of 
absence of fault. The airline had argued that article 17 of the 
Code of Civil Aviation allowing all aircraft freedom of circulation 
h t ·t 16 i ff t t d . t t h" h over Freno erri ory n e ec crea e an air easemen ow 10 
surface owners must submit as long as flight procedures were normal 
and in accordance with civil aviation regulations, and that con-
sequently liability under article 36 should only attach where the 
flight was abnormal. The court rejected this submission as an 
attempt to import the notion of fault, which an "abnormal" flight 
implies, into an area of law from which the legislature had expressly 
excluded it. It held that proof of a causal link between the aircraft 
and damage was sufficient to establish liability. 
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Accordingly, the court commissioned a panel of experts to 
measure from the plaintiffs' apartments the frequency, duration and 
intensity of the noise made by Air France's Caravelles and to deter-
mine whether and to what extent that noise affected health and living 
conditions. 
The airline appealed. 
2. In the Court of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal confirmed the judgment against Air Fra.noe 
but added that inasmuch as it had been common knowledge for some time 
that traffic on busy airports caused annoyance to the population 
nearby, the airline would succeed in proving fault on the part of 
the plaintiffs, in total or partial exoneration of its liability, if 
it were found that the plaintiffs failed to make inquiries about 
foreseeable developments in the use of the airport, and accordingly 
to plan the disposition, insulation and construction of the apartments 
in such a way as to reduce aircraft noise as much as possible to a 
level tolerable to a person of normal health. The court held that to 
the extent the plaintiffs failed to take such precautions, they 
committed a fault and accepted a risk by voluntarily exposing them-
selves to the injury of which they complained. 17 
It therefore ordered that the lower court's commission to 
the panel of experts be altered to include inquiries as to whether 
the price paid by E.R.V.E. for the land was the normal market price 
or a lower price which took into account its proximity to the airport 
and whether at the time the plaintiffs built or bought their apart-
ments, the extension to the airport's runway to accommodate jet 
traffic was already envisaged. 
Finally, the Court of Appeal dismissed the neighbourhood 
association's request for an astreinte, holding that a civil judge 
had no jurisdiction over the operation of a public utility under 
government regulation, and thus could not ban jet aircraft from 
N . . t 18 100 airpor • 
Both Air France and E.R.V.E. appealed. 
3. In the Court of Cassation 
In the Court of Cassation the plaintiff argued that it 
should be compensated for any loss caused by noise which exceeded 
the normal disturbances in the neighbourhood regardless of which 
of the parties was first established there, that the sole fact of 
• 
• 
:) 
0. -~ 
- 6 -
building near the airport did not constitute a fault, and that 
acceptance of risk by the victim could not exonerate the operator. 
Both motions of appeal were dismissed. On the plaintiff's 
motion, the Court of Cassation held that since its case was based 
solely on Air France's liability ipso jure founded on the notion of 
risk without invoking any fault on the airline's part, the Court of 
Appeal was justified in ruling that to the extent the plaintiff 
failed to take reasonable precaution, it committed a fault in 
voluntarily exposing itself to the damage for which it sought 
compensation. 19 
E. The basis of the decisions 
To better appreciate the courts' decisions, it is necessary 
to take a brief excursion into the general law of tort in France 
and more particularly i.l1to the principles on which the courts based 
their rulings. 
1. Article 1384 para. 1 of the Civil Code 20 
Article 1384, al. 1 of tha Civil Code governing liability for 
damage caused by things i n one's custody is one of the two pillars 
of French tort law, the other being articles 1382 and 1383 which 
impose liability for loss or damage caused by one's own fault, 
negligence or imprudence. 
Article 1384, al. 1 reads: "One is liable not only for damage 
caused by one's own acts, but also for damage caused by persons for 
21 
whom one is responsible, and by things which are in one's custody." 
When this paragraph was drafted it uas intended as no thine 
more than a general introduction to the specific provisions spelt out 
in the subsequent paragraphs governing vicarious liability and in 
articles 1385 and 1386 imposing liability without proof of fault for 
damage caused by an animal and by a building in disrepair. At the 
end of the 19th Century, the courts seized on this paragraph to give 
compensation to the increasing numbers of victims of work accidents 
in which machine s were i nvolved but for which it was often impossible 
to prove fault on the part of employers. In a famous jud8znent in 
1896, 22 the Court of Cassation declared article 1384, al. 1 to be 
a. substantive rule in its own right: "Everyone is liable for damage 
caused by things in his custody." Thereafter a victim of an accident 
in which a "thing" was involved could succeed in claiming damages 
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without proving the defendant's fault even if he could not bring 
himself within the scope of articles 1385 or 1386. 
Early attempts to confine the scope of article 1384, al. 1 to 
things of certain description - for example, "inherently dangerous 
things" or "things not activated by the hand of man" - were swept aside 
by the Couxt of Cassation in 1930 23 when it declared the provision to 
have general application. Article 1384, al. 1 applies to a.ny object, 
from a moving oar to a.n inert lettuce leaf left lying on the ground. 
Once causality is established between the thing and the loss or damage 
suffered, the custodian 's liability can only be shifted by proof of an 
act of God or an unforeseeable and unavoidable act of a third party or 
of the victim. As Lawson observed, 24 a literal interpretion of the 
article "undoubtedly gives a result comparable to - or rather more 
far-reaching than - that in Rylands v. Fletcher." 
There has been and continues to be considerable discussion 
and doctrinal disagreement over the theoretical basis of this head of 
liability. On the one hand, there are those who maintain that article 
1384, al. 1 raises a presumption of fault: the very fact that the 
object caused damage is strongly suggestive of some fault or negligence 
on the part of the custodian. The difficulty in this approach is that 
the courts have consistently held that proof of absence of fault does 
not exonerate the custodian. Other writers hold that article 1384, al. 1 
imposes strict liability and that the exonerating factors go to rebut 
not a presumption of fault but a presumption of causality: the cus to-
dian shifts his liability by proving novus actus interveniens between 
the act of the thing in his custody and damage to the plaintiff. 25 
The Court of Cassation has never come down on one side or 
other of the debate, but it has been po i nted out that its Second 
Chamber to which most oases of this nature are reforre has recently 
dropped the formulation "presumption of liability" which it has used 
since the 1930s in relation to article 1384, al. 1 in favour of 
"liability ipso jure", the same term doctrinal writers use for 
objective liability or liability without fault. 26 
2. Article 36 of the Code of Civil Aviation 
Inasmuch as article 36 imposes liability ipso jure for loss 
or damage caused by the movements of an aircraft, it can be said to 
be a particularised application of article 1384, al. 1 in a special 
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code. There are, however, important differences. 
First, while article 1384, al. 1 imposes liability on the 
custodian of a thing, article 36 is concerned with the operator of 
an aircraft. It has been suggested that the basis of the former's 
liability is the power of control he has over the object by virtue 
of which he should be held to guarantee the safety of those who come 
into contact with it, whereas the latter's liability is more properly 
regarded as being based on the principle that he who profits from 
the utilisation of an aircraft should bear the risks associated with 
that utilisation. 27 
Both the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation referred 
to Air France's liability as "founded on the notion of risk". Thus 
any argument Air France might have raised, as was done by another 
airline in a recent similar case, 28 that its pilots not only did 
but had to obey instructions from the control tower on landing and 
take-off and were therefore not in control, would not have availed 
its case since liability for the risks involved was attributable 
under article 36 on the basis of profit and not on the basis of 
power of control. 
Second, the exonerating factor is much more restrictive in 
article 36. Unlike the custodian in article 1384, al. l who 
exonerates himself by proving a break in the chain of causation, 
the aircraft operator is exonerated only because the victim has 
been guilty of blameworthy conduct and it is felt protection should 
be withheld from him by way of sanction. Thus, liability is 
"attenuated or displaced only by proof of fault of the victim" 
a blameless act, however unforeseeable and unavoidable, will not do. 
It has been suggested that this severity stems from the theory of 
risk on which liability under article 36 is grounded. Acts of God 
and unforeseeable acts of strangers causing damage may properly be 
considered part and parcel of the risks associated with flying 
against which the defenceless public on the ground ought rightly 
to be guaranteed by the operator. 29 
As to what constitutes "fault" in article 36, there seems 
to be general agreement among doctrinal writers thRt the plaintiff 
must have committed a fault or imprudence associated with the 
risks of aviation itself. 30 
• 
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3. The principle of liability for excessive neighbourhood 
disturbances 
French courts have consistently held that everyone is expected 
to put up with the normal inconveniences of living in a community. 
On the other hand, liability is imposed on anyone who causes his 
neighbour a greater amount of annoyance than what he should normally 
and reasonably be expected to bear in that particular locality. Such 
a person will be liable even where his act is perfectly lawful and 
nothing can be done to reduce its harmful effect on hie neighbour. 31 
The courts have used this principle to limit damage even 
whe n compensation is sought under other heads of liability, such as 
article 1382 for damage caused by a person's fault or article 1384, 
al. l for damage occasioned by things, wherever the relationship 
between plaintiff and defendant is one of neighbours. 32 In such oases 
damage below the threshold of normal neighbourhood annoyances will 
generally not give rise to compeneation. 33 
Generally speaking the Court of Caeeation has rejected 
arguments by the defendant based on the notion of "pre-occupation" -
that because of his prior installation the plaintiff must be taken 
to have knowingly accepted the risk of disturbance. 34 Lower courts, 
however, have sometimes reduced the amount of damages on this ground. 35 
F. The decision in perspective 
It can now be seen that the decision in E.R.V.E. c. Air France 
combined two heads of delictual civil liability, that imposed on 
aircraft operators for loss or damage caused to members of the public 
on the ground and liability for excessive neighbourhood disturbances. 
First the court held Air France liable ipso jure under article 36 of 
the Code of Civil Aviation; then it used the principle of liability 
for excessive neighbourhood disturbances to determine whether in fact 
there was damage, the airline to pay compensation only if and to the 
extent that the noise made by its Caravelles exceeded the normal 
noise level in the neighbourhood. 
The judges' systematic application of article 36 of the Code 
of Civil Aviation to i nclude damage caused by aircraft noise has 
been almost universally approved by commentators. 36 More contro-
versial was the use of the principle of neighbourhood disturbances 
in determining whether and to what extent damages were payable. 
- 10 -
On the one hand it has been hailed as a. "judicious application" of 
the principle which would preclude vexatious claims and which was 
in line with several doctrinal writers in whose opinion the effect 
of airport noise on nearby inhabitants was a problem in the regulation 
of neighbourhood relations. 37 On the other hand, there are those who 
maintain that since article 36 itself speaks of no minimum, all damage 
however minimal should be compensated. To these writers, the intro-
duction of the concept of neighbourhood disturbances unjustifiably 
limited the amount of compensation to which the plaintiffs were 
entitled. 38 Indeed, one commentator went as far as SU8gesting that 
the unwarranted use of this rule was indicative of the peculiar 
insensitivity of Mediterranean judges to noise, accustomed as they 
were to the racket created by summer vacationiats for several months 
each year! 39 
Equally contentious was the Court of Appeal's definition of 
what would amount to "f'aul t" on the part of the plaintiffs, justify-
ing a reduction in the indemnity payable to them. There appears to 
be some confusion among commentators a.a to whether this "fault" 
relates to article 36 of the Code of' Civil Aviation or to the principle 
of neighbourhood disturbances. Thus some writers have interpreted 
the Count of Appeal as saying that since the airport had been function-
irl8 at that site for many years, unless there was evidence to the 
contrary, by building near the airport the plaintiffs must be taken 
to have accepted the risk of having to suffer the foreseeable 
inconveniences.40 They see this as a return to the notion of 
"pre-occupation" which the Court of Cassation has rejected consistently 
in recent years. It can also be seen that the plaintiff''s unsuccessful 
appeal to the Court of Casaation was based on this contention. 
Other writers point out that traditionally the only f'ault 
justif'ying a diminution in damages under article 36 was a fault 
committed in connection with the actual physical movements of the 
aircraft, 41 which was clearly not the case here. 
With respect, it is submitted tha t neither criticism is 
tenable. While the court used the theory of neighbourhood disturbances 
to determine what level of damages was payable, it does not necessarily 
follow that the plaintiff's fault should also be defined in that 
context. In fact the theory was not mentioned at all in the judgment 
of the Court of Appeal which spelt out in some detail what constituted 
- 11 -
"fault 11 , and the Court of Cassation only gave it a passing mention, 
placing the weight of its judgment on confirming the lower court's 
interpretation of article 36 and its definition of "fault". At no 
time did either court relate "fault" to the notion of "pre-occupation" 
or to the principle of neighbourhood disturbs.noes. 
On the other hand, because "fault" was defined in the context 
of article 36, it does not mean that the court was unjustified in 
extending it beyond acts directly connected with aerial navigation. 
It may be true that when the provision was first enacted in 1924, 
the legislature had in mind damage caused by aircraft crashes.
42 
But that was because at the stage of technology then prevailing, air 
crashes and objects falling from aircraft comprised the major, if not 
the only, risks associated with aviation. It does not mean that these 
should remain the only risks against which those on the surface should 
be protected no matter what new risks have been created by advances 
in technology. 
To the extent that the operator's liability is base d on 
risk, the plaintiff's conduct must be evaluated in the light of his 
contribution to the risk from which he is seeking protection.
43 
If that risk is noise ge nerated by aircraft movements on an airport, 
then surely he must be consiclered to have contributed to it - that i s , 
committed a fault or an imprudence within the meaning of articles 
1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code - by building near the airport 
without taking precautions aga inst the foreseeable consequences. 
Perhaps the most penetrating criticism of the judgment was 
made in a note to the recent case, briefly referred to above, when 
the Commune of Villeneuve-le-Ro i near Paris, in much the same 
circumstance and with r::IUCh the same result, took Air ~Ta.nee, Pa.n 
American Airways and T.W.A. to court for jet noise at Orly Airport.
44 
The learned writer of the note voiced his disapproval of judicial 
policy which, in the fight against environmental pollution in all 
its forms, has turned the airlines into scapegoats for the problem 
of airport jet noise on the pretext that they pro f it from their 
business, despite the fact that many of them are heavily subsidised 
by their governments. He considered that issue s concerning aircraft 
noise should not be broueht within the ambit of article 36 at all, 
since the prov i sion covers risks associa ted with flying, and noise, 
being a normal and kno"Wll effect of aerial navigation and therefore 
not a "risk", s hould more properly be dealt with under the principle 
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of liability for excessive neighbourhood disturbances. There is 
also merit in the view that since aircraft are required by law only 
to land on and take off from aerodromes which a.re established in 
accordance with regulations, the real culprit was the airport 
authority who brought trouble to the neighbourhood by siting the 
airport there. According to this commentator, aircraft operators 
have been wrongly penalised because the search for the real cause 
of disturbance has been conducted at too superficial a level. 
With the greatest respect to this commentator's perspicacity, 
this was precisely the argument put forward by Air France in the 
court of first instance when it joined the Chamber of Commerce, 
licensed operator of the airport, as third party to the action. 
This was also the basis for the declinatoire de com~tence lodged 
by the Prefect of Alpes-Maritimes claiming administrative jurisdiction 
over the case. 45 It would seem unlikely that the point was overlooked; 
it seems more likely that it was deliberately avoided. The whole 
decision must be seen in the light of what it was that the courts 
were being asked to do. They were put in the position of having to 
make priority choices which belonged in the political rather than 
the judicial arena. All the courts could do was to mount a reargu3rd 
holding action pendi!lB resolution by the legislature of what is in 
essence a conflict of fundamental values. As such their tactics 
were most successful. \lhile seeming to make far-reaching pronounce-
ments of law, they in fact merely held the status quo. 
Perhaps the point can be made more clearly by asking the 
question: What would have happened if the court had decided 
differently? If it had acquitted Air France, future plaintiffs 
would sue the airport. If they sued the airport the case uould be 
decided by reference to the theory of excessive neighbourhood 
disturbances since article 36 only governs the liability of aircraft 
oporators. In an action for excessive neighbourhood disturbances, 
the notion of "pre-occupation" cannot be used to reduce damages. 
The airport authority will have to pay the full amount of losses 
suffered by the plaintiffs. Since moat airports in !<'ranee are 
managed by public bodies, this couli be ruinous for the state coffers, 
particularly in view of the fact that administrative liability for 
the compensation of damage caused by the establishment of public 
works seems to be as "generous" as civil liability for excessive 
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neighbourhood disturbances.46 
Instead, the ruling that damage caused by aircraft noise at 
airports was governed by article 36 diverted court actions away from 
airport authorities. Although Air France's option to pursue the 
Chamber of Commerce in the administrative courts was kept open at all 
stages of the case, it appears that its chances of success would have 
been small in an action against the management of a public utility of 
which it was itself a user. 47 At the same time, aircraft operators 
can be protected from crippling compensation payments by a judicious 
definition of "fault" which, without violating legal principles, 
results in considerable reduction in damages. Indeed, the Court of 
Appeal was able to reassure Air France on this soore even before the 
panel of experts returned with their findings! 48 
There remains the problem posed by those who built or bought 
their homes in the neighbourhood prior to the establishment of the 
airport. As has been pointed out49 the corollary of defining fault 
as failure to talce precautions against foreseeable damage is that 
those who could not possibly have foreseen the likelihood of such 
damage must be fully compensated. The courts seem to have found a 
way round this by ruling in the Villeneuve-le-Roi case that those 
who live in cities and are by this very fact subjected to various 
inconveniences which they must endure, cannot be more exacting towards 
an airline than they are toward a user of the public highway. 50 
It all depends on who is considered to be "a user", of course, and 
how close you are to the highway, but if damage from aircraft noise 
is to be measured by the number of decibels above those generated by 
some of the monstrous transport lorries that ply the roads in France, 
the plaintiff may not be greatly consoled by his compensation. 
III. RE,IEDIES UNDER NEW ZEALAND LAW 
Lest a Kiwi master-builder be moved to say, "That could 
never happen here", an attempt will be made to evaluate the chances 
of success under New Zealand law of someone in the position of the 
principal plaintiff in E.R.V.E. c. Air France. The adequacy of the 
common law remedies for lose or damage oaused by aircraft noise will 
be examined briefly.51 This will be followed by a discussion of the 
extent to which these remedies may have been abrogated by statute. 
- 14 -
A. Trespass 
Quite apart from the noise it makes, does the mere entry of 
an aircraft into the airspace above privately owned land give rise 
to an action in trespass? It has been often said that whoever owns 
the soil 01ms all that lies above it: cujus est solum, ejus est 
usque ad coelum. There is, however, no general agreement on the exact 
ambit of this maxim. McNair's review of cases and textbooks52 shows 
that some judges have regarded it as nothing less than a rule of law, 
while to others it is a "mere presumption". Writers have generally 
taken a cautious approach. Even those who considered that an invasion 
of airspace constituted trespass limited their observations to that 
part of the airspace which was within the occupier's ordinary use or 
effective control. Until very recently, the cases in which the maxim 
has been invoked have all dealt with the competing rights of adjace nt 
surface occupiers over such matters as overhanging branches, structural 
projections, trespassing animals, shooting across the land of another, 
and telephone or telegraph wires. 53 As Fleming observed, 54 these 
cases "established no wider proposition than that the air above the 
surface is subject to dominion in so far as the use of the space is 
necessary for the proper enjoyment of the surface." 
The recent case of Bernstein v. Skyviews & General Ltd.55 
would appear to support this view of the law. In what seems to be 
the only English decision in which the maxim was considered in the 
context of overflight by an aircraft, the owner of a country house 
brought an action agai nst a company which was i n the busine ss of 
taking aerial photographs of property anu offering then for sale to 
the owners, alleging that in the course of photographing hi s house 
without permission the company's helicopter had trespassed in the 
airspace above his property and invaded his rieht to privacy. 
Griffiths J. held that although it was well established tha t an owner 
had certain rights in the airspace above hiB laY11l , there was no support 
in authority for the view that these extended to an unlimited height. 
The learned judge saw th problem as one of balancing the owner's 
rights agains t those of the general public to take advantage of all 
that science offered in the use of airsDace, and concluded that 
"the balance wan best struck by restrictir1g the owner's rights .•• 
to such height as was necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment 
of his land and structure s u pon it, and declaring that above that 
• 
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height he had no greater rights in the airspace than any other member 
of the public. 1156 Applying the test to the case before him, Griffiths 
J. held that no trespass had occurred. 
It is submitted that any other view of the law could involve 
the courts in the impossible task of trying to determine whether 
there has been an invasion of a particular column of airspace several 
thousand feet above the ground. This is not to say that an action 
in trespass may never be available but it would seem that actual 
overflight must have occurred and at a height which adversely affects 
the use and enjoyment of the surfaoe.57 This effectively removes the 
traditional advantage of a trespass action, which is that no damage 
need be proved. 
Two other factors suggest that a trespass action would not 
provide adequate remedy for those seeking relief from airport noise. 
First, it is the people closest to the airport rather than necessarily 
those directly under the flight paths who suffer the worst effects. 
Second, the noise may reach an intolerable level well before the 
criteria for making out a trespass case can be satisfied. 
B. Negligence 
To succeed in negligence, a plaintiff must establish that 
the defendant owes him a duty to take reasonable care and that this 
duty has been breached, causing him dama e as a result. As McNair 
points out, 58 there seems no good reason why an aviator should not 
owe the same duty of care which i s owed by car drivers or maritime 
navigators to those who would foreseeably suffer damage ac a result 
of their carelessness. 
In the context of airport noise, however, it is submitted 
that there are obstacles to establishing a breach of duty. Although 
civil aviation legislation59 stipulates the conditions under which 
aircraft noise may be made on airport e , it does not set any upper 
limits beyond which noise is prohibited. It thus seems feasible 
for an aircraft owner or operator to argue first, tha t he owes no 
duty to refrain from making noise which is expressly allowed by 
statute; and second , that since the legislation sets no limit to 
the amount of noise which may be made, what is reasonable must depend 
on what is possible, so tha t he cannot be held to owe a standard 
of care which cannot be attained in the existing state of technology. 
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Unless a pilot fails to follow flight regulations, therefore - a.nd 
it would be extremely difficult for a surface occupier to prove all 
but the most glaring contraventions - it is difficult to see how a 
negligence action can succeed. What is more, it is unlikely that 
these obvious breaches will occur so persistently as to enable a 
land owner to claim that they have caused his property to decrease 
in value. 
It is by no means certain in any case that such devaluation 
will be recoverable. Economic loss not immediately resulting from 
physical damage to person or property has generally not been recover-
able in negligence actions in England. For example, in Spartan 
Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd.fO while the 
plaintiff was compensated for damage to his machinery caused by the 
defendant's negligence and for the value of the metal melt in the 
machine when the breakdown occurred, loss of the profit he would 
have made from subsequent melts had the machinery not been damaged 
was considered too remote. There is some indication that Now Zealand 
courts may take a broader view. In Bowen v. Paramount .Buildera61 
the plaintiff claimed a sum representing the depreciation in the 
market value of the property which would not have occurred had there 
been no subsidence ca.usine structural damage. The Court of Appeal 
awarded the sum in addition to the cost of repairs and alterations. 
Richmond P. held that although in one sense it could be described 
as economic loss, it was "economic loss directly and immediately 
connected with the structural damage to the building and a s such 
62 properly recoverable. 11 However, it is submitted that thi s is 
still some distance away from allowing a claim for property devaluation 
in a negligence action where there has been no physical damage at all. 
C. Nuisance 
In many respects nuisance would seem to be the most effective 
action against airport noise. 63 First, it is well established that 
excessive noise constitutes a nuisance. 64 Second, once there is 
damage, the pla intiff does not have to prove t~~t it was cause d by 
the defendant' s fault or negligenoe. 65 Third, it is no defence that 
the plaintiff came to the nuisance knowingly. 66 Fourth, the remedy 
ava ilable i s the most appropria t e . The courts oari in their discretion 
grant an injunction restraining the continuance of the act or omission 
caus ing the nuisance an will gener a lly d o ao unles s thio would be 
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unjust or oppressive to the defendant and the plaintiff can be 
adequately compensated by a small money payment. 67 Fifth, there is 
some indication that property devaluation caused by a nuisance is 
recoverable in damages, 68 although a New Zealand plaintiff may have 
difficulty proving property devaluation caused by airport noise in 
the lisht of two studies undertaken by the Valuation epartment both 
of which concluded that the introduction of jet aircraft into 
Wellington airport has not had any "permanent detrimental effect on 
the prices of houses nearby". 69 
Three courses of action are open to the land owner or 
occupier disturbed by excessive airport noise. He can sue in private 
nuisance claiming that in the use of its land the airport authority 
is depriving him of the use and enjoyment of hio land. He should 
succeed if he can establish serious interference with his comfort 
according to notions prevalent among ordinary people, and that the 
interference is unreasonable having regard to the particular locality 
in which it occurs. 70 Alternatively he can bring an action in public 
nuisance if he can prove that he suffered special damage over and 
above that sustained by the public at large. This would normally 
be difficult to establish for aircraft noise coming from a neighbour-
ing airport • 
The third course of action open to him is to seek a fiat from 
the Attorney-General enabling a relater action to be commenced 
against the airport authority. In view of numerous overseas studies 
on the harmful effect of noise on human health, there should in theory 
be little difficulty in convincing a court that excessive aircraft 
noise so interferes with the health, convenience anu comfort of all 
persons who come within the sphere of its operation as to constitute 
a public nuisance. 71 
Nevertheless, a nuisance action, private or public, may fail 
for two reasons. First, the airport authority may succeed in claiming 
that since no negligence is involved, "the statutory authority con-
ferred upon a local body to construct and maintain /j,ubliiJ works 
necessarily .•• includes authority for the creation and existence 
of .•• necessary nuisances." 72 Second, althou h the social utility 
of the activity complained of is no defence, it is a factor to be 
taken into account. The Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v. 
Abraham & Williams Ltd. was unanilaous that an injunction to close 
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certain stockyards declared to be a public nuisance because of smell, 
flies and noise should not be refused on the ground that an alternative 
site could not be found and that closing the yard would impose hard-
ship on the farming community and seriously impair the efficiency of 
the city abbatoirs. Kennedy J. said, 73 "The inconvenience and hard-
ship caused to a defendant if a nuisance is restrained is no ground 
for permitting its continuance ••• Neither has the circumstance that 
the wrongdoer is in some sense a public benefactor ever been 
considered a sufficient reason for refusing to protect by injunction 
an individual whose rights are being persistently infringed." 
Notwithstanding such strong words, it would be idle to insist that 
the vastly greater cost in time, effort and money of moving an airport 
compared to that involved in shifting a stockyard would make no 
difference in a :process in which "the court is in effect determining 
the relative value of different land uses. 1174 
It is submitted that in any case a court is unlikely to 
grant an injunction in wider terms than the night curfew which already 
operates in many airports throughout the world, including Wellington.75 
D. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher 
Under this rule a person who for his own :purposes and for 
a "non-natural" use introduces onto his land anything which is 
likely to do mischief if it escapes is liable without proof of 
negligence for the consequences of its escape. It does not seem 
that the rule has ever been applied to noise although there is theore-
tically no reason against such an application. One major obstacle 
is the need for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was using 
his land in a "non-natural" way. It would certainly be very difficult 
to establish that operating an airport is a "non-natural" use of 
lantl in this day and age in view of Lord Porter's comment in Read v. 
76 Lyons & Co. Ltd. that "all the circumstances of the time and 
place and practice of mankind must be taken into consideration so 
that what might be regarded as dangerous or non-natural may vary 
according to those circumstances." Further, it was held by the 
Privy Council in Rickaxds v. Lothian 77 that "such a use as is 
proper for the general benefit of the community" woul not bring 
the principle into play. 
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As in a nuisance action, the probabilities are that an airport 
authority will succeed in making out the defence of statutory authority. 
E. Civil aviation legislation 
In New Zealand the availability of redress against aircraft 
noise is governed by section 23 of the Civil Aviation Act 1964.78 
Subsection (1) of that section provides for regulations to be made 
a) governing the conditions under which noise or vibration may be 
made by aircraft on aerodromes, and 
b) applying subsection (2) to aerodromes where the making of noise 
and vibration is regulated. 
Subsection (2) precludes any nuisance action for noise and 
vibration caused by aircraft on any aerodrome covered by the regu-
lations mentioned in subsection (1) so long as those regulations aro 
complied with. 
Subsection (3) provides: 
"No action shall lie in respect of trespass, or in respect 
of nuisance, by reason only of the flight of aircraft over 
any property at a height above the ground which having 
regard to wind, weather, anu all the circumstances of the 
case is reasonable, ••• so long as the provisions of this 
Act and of any regulations or Proclamations made thereunder 
are duly complied with; but where material damage or loss 
is caused by an aircraft in flight, taJ·ing off, landing, 
or alighting, ••• or by any article ••• falling from any 
such aircraft, to any person or property on land or water, 
damages shall be recoverable from the owner of the aircraft 
in respect of the damage or loss, without proof of negligence 
or intention or other cause of action, as if the damage or 
loss had been caused by ~is fault, except where tho damage 
or loss was caused by or contributed to by the fault of the 
person by whom the same wao suffered." 79 
There is very little case law on this legislation. Phe only 
English case on the section80 held (obiter) that the immunity of 
overflight under section 23(3) exter.ded to a helicopter hovering 
over private land, and the only two New Zealand cases were concorned 
with the scope of application of the words "article" and "landing11 • 81 
Four points should be noted about this legislation. First, 
under section 23(3) only thos aircraft which maintain a reasonable 
height in all the circumstances of the case and comply with all 
82 civil aviation regulations are immune. It has been suggested that 
since the statute exempts aircraft own rs from a liability which 
would otherwise exist, the requirement of cocpliance should be 
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strictly applied so that immunity is lost even where the breach has 
no causal connection with the trespass or nuisance complained of, 
as for example, the omission of a "No Smoking" notice in circumstances 
required by regulations. Even if the courts were to adopt this 
interpretation of the statute, only by a rare combination of 
fortuitous circumstances could a potential plaintiff on the ground 
hope to prove such a contravention. 
Second, the aircraft owner is liable only for "material" 
daoage or loss. The word has never been judicially interpreted in 
the context of section 23(3) but it has been auggested83 that it 
should be given the wider meaning of loss measurable in money terms 
rather than restricted to physical damage. Against this it may be 
argued that although this would not be a case involving negligence, 
nevertheless the general principle should be followed of not allow-
ing a claim for purely economic loss unaccompanied by any physical 
damage to person or property. 
Third, since section 23(3) specifies the remedy available -
"damages shall be recoverable from the owner of the aircraft ••• 11 -
there is at least an inference that other remedies, e.g. an injunction, 
are excluded. 
Fourth, under section 23( 6) "fault" is defined as "negligence ••• 
or other act or omission which ••• would, apart from the Contributory 
Negligence Act 1947, give rise to the defence of contributory 
negligence." Contributory negligence has been defined as "failure by 
a person to use reasonable care for the safety of himself or his 
property so that he becomes 'an author of his own wron a' . 11 84 
This combination would in effect enable an airport authority to 
claim total or partial exonera tion if a plaintiff came to the nuisance 
knowingly, a defence which woula not be available in a nuisance action. 
It will be recalled that Air France's strict liability under article 
36 of the French Code of Civil Aviation was considerably attenuated 
by a similar definition of "fault" (ante, pages 6, 10-11 ) . 
The sum of these considerations would suggest that the 
Civil Aviation Act 1964 affords little comfort to those suffering 
from the effects of noise from a neighbourin airport. 85 At the same 
time, the Act seems at fir s t glance to abrogate the available 
common law remedies except for neglig nee, which, it has been 
suggeste above, is by no means easy to establish in this context. 
11here may, however, be loopholes in the legislation. 
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First, it has been suggested that since neither Regulation 
190A of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1953 setting out the conditions 
under which noise and vibration may be made on aerodromes nor any 
other regulations made pursuant to the Civil Aviation Act 1964 
contains 
required 
nuisance 
words specifically applying section 23(2) to aerodromes as 
by subsection (1), subsection (2) is not operative to preclude 
t . . t . ft . . -t 86 ac ions agains aircra noise on airpor s . 
Second, it has been maintained that if the word "on" in 
section 23(1) is interpreted to mean "supporte<l by or in contact with 
the surface", then a nuisance action may be taken against the noise 
antl vibration an aircraft makes in landing and take-off operations 
after it loses contact with the ground.
87 
Third, since subsection (3) precludes trespaso and nuisance 
actions by reason only of flight over any property, it leaves ape. 
the question whether a nuisance actio brought by a plaintiff whose 
88 
property is not directly beneath the flight path is also precluded. 
This line of inquiry, however, could lead to the absurd result that 
a plaintiff who lies directly beneath a flight path is denied a 
remedy which may be available to his nextdoor neighbour. 
Fourth, the words in subsection ( 3) "by reason only of the 
fli ht of an aircraft ••• " strictly speaking shoulrl. not, it is 
submitted, preclude a nuisance action against the noise made by th 
aircraft whether or not it flies directly over a plaintiff's property. 
The first point has not been taken up by other writers, 
who have assumed that Regulation 190A has put section 23(2) into 
effect. 89 
Since Regulation 190A allows noise anQ vibration to be made 
by aircraft at licensed aerodromes during take-off and landing, the 
last three arguments depend for their success on the acceptance of 
a prior contention that Regul~tion 190A i s ultra vireo of section 
23(1) which only provides for the regulation of noise on orodromeo. 
This is not a case where th enabling statute empowers subordinate 
legislation to modify the application of the stat te,
90 but neither 
is it one of those obvious cases where subordinate legislation is 
prima facie ultra vires because it is inconsistent with the substantive 
provisions of the enablin statute.
91 
As the New Zealand legislation is taken almost word for word 
from tho United Kingdom legislation, it may be of assistance to look 
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at the way the latter has been construed. Section 41(1) and (2) of 
the Civil Aviation Act 1949 (U.K.), like section 23(1) and (2), provides for 
the regulation of noise and vibration on aerodromes and precludes 
nuisance actions where such regulations apply. Both that section anu 
Regulation 12 of Air Navigation (General) Regulations 1974, the United 
Kingdom equivalent of Regulation 190A, use the word "on" aerodromes. 
Under the Land Compensation Act 1973, land owners and occupiers have 
been given a right to compensation for de preciation by physical 
factors (including noise) caused by the use of public works (including 
airports). 92 Section 1(5) of that Act provides: "Physical factors 
caused by an aircraft arriving at or departing from an aerodrome shall 
be treated as caused by the use of the aerodrome whether or not the 
aircraft is within the boundaries of the aerodrome ••• " Since the Act 
is intended to provide compensation only in cases where land owners 
or occupiers will not otherwise have a remedy, the implication is that 
the Civil Aviation Act 1949 precludes nuisance actions for noise and 
vibration caused by aircraft around as well as on aerodromes. 
It is submitted that in view of this and of the important 
interests at stake in the smooth functioning of the aviation industry, 
the courts are likely to give the statute "such fair, l arge and 
liberal construction ••• as will best ensure the attainment of the 
object of the Act ••• according to its true intent, meaning and 
spirit 11 , 93 and to hold that Regulation 190A is not ultra vires 
section 23 of the Civil Aviation Act 1964. 
F. Summary 
The likely effectiveness of the legal remedies discussed 
above in providing relief from airport noise may be summarised ao 
follows: 
1) The Civil Aviation Act 1964 provides compensation for "material" 
damage or lose. What is "material" will probably be a matter 
of policy (e.g. the floodgate argument). 
2) The Act purports to preclude trespass and nuisance actions against 
the normal overflight of aircraft, and nuisance actions against 
aircraft noise and vibration at airports. The extent to which 
it does so depends on how strictly the statute is interpreted, 
but the courts are unlike ly to allow a case through the possible 
loopholes. 
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3) A trespass action for invasion of airspace is unlikely to succeed 
in normal circumstances. 
4) The Act does not preclude an action in negligence but this will 
usually be very difficult to prove. Whether property devaluation 
without any physical damage is recoverable in negligence is 
uncertain and would depend on policy considerations. 
5) A nuisance action will probably be successfully defended by an 
airport authority on the ground of statutory authority. Consi-
derations of social utility will also work in its favour. 
6) An action under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher will also probably 
fail because of the difficulty in maintaining that an airport 
is a "non-natural" use of land. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
11hether the case is argued at common law or as a statutory 
offence under the Civil Aviation Aot 1964, it will involve questions 
of law which are by no means clear-cut. In such situations a court's 
interpretation of the law is likely to be influenced by implicit 
policy considerations. The court will be faced with making a decision 
which will have policy repercussions of several dimensions, ranging 
from competing economic interests at the national level to questions 
of fundamental choices of global concern. There will also be 
ramifications for "'-Tew Zealand's international trade, diplomatic 
relations and regional co-operation. It is submitted that the 
decision will probably be guided by the narrower rather than the 
wider policy considerations, simply because the ,•ider concerns will 
not be immediately at issue and will involve matters whicl, ultimately 
are not amenable to judicial settlement. 
The courts in l!; .R.V.E • .9_. Air France probably saw themselves 
as striking a balance between the social utility of commercial air 
travel and the need to meet the demand for housing in short supply. 
From an economic viewpoint their decision was clearly right. Since 
it is possible to build apartments elsewhere than ne:x:t to an ai:rport, 
their decision would not discourage housing development in general, 
whereas a contrary finding could have serious consequences for the 
development of air traffic ancl aircraft prototypes. 
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It should not surprise our master-builder, therefore, if 
like his French cousin, he finds the courts reluctant to place his 
interests unequivocably above those of the aviation industry. Kiwi 
complacency notwithstanding, he may be driven to the sort of direct 
action envisaged in this illustration 94 commemorating the recent 
U.S. Federal court order allowing the Concorde landing rights on 
John F. Kennedy International Airport .... 
'Damn the court, DON'T LET rr LANDII' 
87. Rrprod11n·cl ,dth kind pr1nmsion f10111 Xi.is:11ek I nt 11 nalwnal \fa, '.? 1977, 3 1 
-
.3 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 The phenomenon of the sonic bang will not be covered in this paper. 
2 
It differs from the problem of aircraft noise at airports both in 
the nature of the damage caused and the pop.ilation affected. Sonic 
bangs occur in the wake of a supersonic aircraft at all times when 
it is travelling faster than the speed of sound and not just at 
the instant when it breaks the sound barrier. The effect is felt 
by all those within the "sonic carpet" along the aircraft's flight 
path, typically an area 30 to 130 kilometres wide. The population 
affected is potentially larger and situated well away from airports. 
Sonic bangs cause structural damage to buildings, the most frequent 
being shattered glass and cracked plaster. This damage is different 
in nature to the property devaluation suffered by inhabitants near 
airports. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Report to the 
President and Congress on Noise, Washington, February 1972, pp. I-60 
to 61; and J. Causse et R. Combaldieu, "Les 'bangs supersoniques' 
et leurs effets nocifs", D.1967 Chron. 5. 
E.g., recent discussions about noise abatement regulations for 
Paraparaumu Airport, Evening Post, 2 August 1977, p.10. 
3 Trib. grande inst. de Nice, 9 dee. 1964, D. 1965.221, note Derrida; 
J.C.P. 1965.11.14074, note de JuglartJ Rev . fra.n9. dr. aerien 
(R.F.D.A.) 1965.234, concl. Lavirotte; Rev. gen. air et espace 
(R.G.A.E.) 1964.416, note Villeneuve. Cour d'appel d'Aix, 17 fev. 
1966, D. 1966, 281, note Derrida; J.C.P. 1966.II.14755, note 
Villeneuve; R.F.D.A. 1966.230; R.G.A.E. 1966.57, note Goy. 
Cour de cassation 28 Ch. civ., 8 mai 1968, D. 1968.609; J.C.P. 
1968.II.15595, note de Juglart et du Pontavice; R.F.D.A. 1968.327, 
note Georgiad~s. 
4 D. 1965. 223 
5 The report of the caoe does not say these were the first commercial 
jets on the airport but this may be inferred from the Court of Appeal's 
order, mentioned on p.5, thRt inquiries be made as to whether the 
extension to the airport runway to accommodate jet traffic was 
envisaged at the time the plaintiff built his apartments. 
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6 The astreinte serves a function similar to that of contempt of court 
which is unknown in French law. It is a discretionary device created 
by the courts to induce compliance with court orders and consists of a 
fine for each specified period of time - usually a day - the execution 
of the court order is delayed. The amount of the fine is fixed 
according to the means of the party against whom it is made and the 
degree of his bad faith in resisting execution of the principal order. 
It is payable to the plaintiff in addition to damages. For a more 
detailed discussion, see B. Starck, Obligation II, Paris, 1972, pp. 
764-774; and Peter Herzog, Civil Procedure in France, The Hague, 1967, 
pp. 560-564. The astreinte is now enshrined in statute, Loi no.72-626 
du 5 juillet 1972: see v. Chabas, "La reforme de l'astreinte", 
D. 1972 Chron. 271. 
7 D. 1965.224. The facts do not indicate whether the other airlines 
used Caravelles or other types of jet aircraft. 
8 Within the civil courts structure, there are several types of courts 
at first instance. The ordinary court of first instance, and the most 
important, is the tribunal de grande instance. This is somewhat akin 
to the New Zealand Supreme Court at first instance. There are a total 
of 172 tribunaux de grande instance, one in each d~partement with 
additional ones where the workload is heavy. The tribunal d'instance 
hears cases involving small claims. There are a total of 455, one 
in each arrondissement. These courts may be considered the equivalent 
of magistrate's courts in New Zealand. In addition, there are courts 
dealing exclusively in specialised areas, for example, the commercial 
and labour courts. Appeals from all these courts are heard in the 27 
regional courts of appeal; jud.gments are reviewed on appeal on 
points of law by the Court of Cassation in Paris. See Herzog, op. cit., 
pp. 137-169. 
9 Headed by the Conseil d'Etat. 
10 There are some 230 commercial courts created by government decree where 
needed. The judges are businessmen elected indirectly by their peers. 
Each commercial court consists of one presiding judge elected for a 
terra of three years anu two or more associate juci8es, plus a number 
of alternates. The judges must be at least thirty years of age and 
have been in their business occupation for five years. Ea.eh case is 
heard by at least three judges. Herzog, op. cit., pp. 144-146. 
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11 Decret no. 58-1285 of 22 December 1958. 
12 A positive conflict of jurisdiction arises "whenever the administration 
objects to a case proceeding in one of the ordinary courts on the ground 
that the latter lack jurisdiction. The prefect of the departement 
in which the court sits must lo<3.8e with the court a formal "deolinatoire 
de competence" calling upon it to withdraw; if it refuses to do so, 
the prefect may proceed to "raise the conflict" before the Tribunal 
des Conflits." L. Neville Brown and J.F. Garner, French Administrative 
Law, London, 1967, p. 73. 
13 Promulgated by Decret no.55-1590 of 30 November 1955. The Code was 
revised by Decret no.67-333 of 30 March 1967. Article 36 is now 
article L.141-2. 
14 D. 1965.222. 
15 "L' exploi tant d 'tm aeronef est responsable de plein droi t des dommages 
causes par lea evolutions de l'aeronef ou les objets qui e'en 
detaoheraient, aux personnes et aux biens situea a la surface. Cetta 
responsabilite ne peut ~tre attenuee ou ecartee que par la preuve de 
la faute de la victime. 11 
16 "Les aeronefs peuvent circuler librement au-d.essus des territoires 
fra.n9ais ••• 11 This article, renumbered L.131-1 sinoe the revision of 
30 March 1967, is in derogation of article 552 of the Civil Code 
which gives the surface owner ownership of what lies above and beneath 
his landi "La propriete du sol emporte la propriete du dessus et du 
dessous." Cf. discussion of the ad coelum maxim at Common Law, post 
pp. 14-15. 
17 "··· dana la mesure ob lee demandeura d'indemnite ont neglige de 
prendre de telles precautions, ils auraient commie une faute et accepte 
un risque en s•exposant volontairemer. t a subir tout ou partie du 
prejudice dont ils se plaignent ••• " • 1966.282. The Court of Appeal 
seemed to imply there was an element of volenti as well as contributory 
negligence in the notion of ''fault". Thio has misled several commen-
tators as to the ground on which fault was baaed, post p.10. But cf. 
Court of Ca.ssation's definition of fault, post p.6. 
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18 It may be of interest to note that there is a similar remedy under 
Japanese law. In the Osaka International Airport noise pollution 
trial in which 272 residents sued the government (there is no equivalent 
of a class action in Japanese law) for mental distress and physical 
injury to health caused by aircraft noise, the Osaka High Court ordered 
the government to pay n1,ooo per month to each plaintiff for damage 
which might be inflicted in the future until the night curfew imposed 
by the court was observed, and ¥6,600 per person per month until the 
residents and the state reached agreement on restrictive measures, 
including a reduction in the number of flights. These sums were pay-
able in addition to ¥1,328,ooo per plaintiff for past suffering. The 
damages were ordered pursuant to article 2 of the Tort Claims against 
the State Act (Kokka Baisho Ho) 1947 c.125 which provided for compen-
sation for damage arising from the maladministration of government 
establishments. See H. Tanaka (ed.), The Japanese Legal System, Tokyo, 
1976, p.443. 
19 "Attendu que ••• la oour d'appel a pu ••• deduire que dans la mesure 
20 
21 
22 
ob la Societe E.R.V.E., qui se prevalait d'une responsabilite de plain 
droit fondee sur la notion de risque et n'invoquait aucune faute contre 
la Compagnie Air-France, aurait neglige de prendre de telles precautions, 
elle aurait commie une faute en s•exposant volontairement a subir le 
dommage dont elle demandait reparation ••• " D. 1968.610. It is clear 
from this definition that the plaintiff's fault lies not in acceptance 
of risk but contribution to the risk involved. 
For the sake of brevity and uniformity with standard practic, the 
French form of citation will be used for this article and paragraph, 
i.e. article 1384, al. 1. 
"On est responsable non seulement du domma.ge que l'on cause par son 
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